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Summary
Our objective was to study the need for regulating hedge funds, using existing
regulatory approaches and our own models as a frame of reference. Our questions
include: Should hedge funds remain unregulated? Should potential regulation of
hedge funds fall within the present regulatory structure, or do we need new ap-
proaches to effectively regulate hedge funds, and if so what would those approaches
be?
Existing studies have highlighted the broad benefits that hedge funds can provide
to the financial system in terms of diversification, competition and price discovery.
Our models emphasise the extremely valuable role that hedge funds, as unregu-
lated institutions, can play in alleviating liquidity problems. Suppose all financial
institutions were regulated, and the economy suffers a significant shock leading to
a liquidity crisis. In this case the regulated institutions may be prevented from
engaging in essential trading activity for regulatory reasons, perversely exasperat-
ing the crisis. Unregulated financial institutions, such as hedge funds, are not so
restricted and will see a benefit in trading, thus helping to contain the crisis.
Despite these potential benefits of hedge fund activities, there are compelling rea-
sons why some form of regulation of hedge funds is necessary. In particular, we
would highlight that there is a real potential that the collapse of a large hedge
fund may trigger a systemic crisis episode, carrying with it significant economic
costs. Furthermore, whilst such a collapse may break the current impasse in the
regulatory debate it is likely to lead to a knee-jerk reaction by the public and
politicians, forcing the implementation of inefficient and overbearing regulations.
By contrast we find arguments for regulating hedge funds directly for reasons of
consumer protection unconvincing.
Unfortunately, most discussion on the regulation of hedge funds proposes to fit
hedge funds within the existing regulatory structure (disclosure and activity re-
strictions), and fails to address the unique nature of hedge funds. We argue that
such regulations are inappropriate, and would either be ineffective or cause an ir-
revocable harm to the hedge fund industry, impeding their ability to deliver wider
market benefits.
The systemic risk from hedge funds stems from the aftermath of a large funds
collapse, not the ongoing regular trading activities of solvent funds. Therefore
regulations should aim at containing the fallout from any such default so as to
minimise market disruption. At the same time, regulations should not hinder the
benefits associated with funds regular operations.
We suggest that this can most effectively be implemented by instituting a formal
resolution process whereby the regulator, prime brokers, and client banks all have
the legal obligation to ensure that the fund be unwound as quickly as possible.
Clearly, such an organized resolution process must not be confused with a bailout,
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1 Introduction
Hedge funds occupy a unique place as the only financial institutions exempted
from most prudential regulation. When hedge funds remained niche players,
their special regulatory status raised few concerns. However, in recent years
assets under management by hedge funds have grown exponentially1 and so
have worries about their impact on the financial system, prompted by the
role of hedge funds in the major financial crisis episodes of the 1990s such as
the ERM, Asian, and LTCM crises. More recently, alleged cases of fraudulent
behavior have added further, micro–prudential concerns.
These events precipitated a heated debate about the regulatory status of
hedge funds and a number of wide–ranging national and supra–national reg-
ulatory reviews.2 The debate has been further fuelled by the conspicuous
exclusion of hedge funds from the Basel–II process. Much of this debate has
focused on a narrow range of arguments, leading to extreme conclusions: ei-
ther fully regulate hedge funds like other financial institutions, or leave them
unregulated. A more nuanced analysis of the pros and cons of hedge funds is
likely to reject these extreme views and prescriptions for public policy reform
ought to reflect a balanced analysis of the whole spectrum of views.
Our objective is to identify the key economic reasons for and against regu-
lating hedge funds, and consider the potential optimal form of regulation.
The arguments in favor of regulating hedge funds focus both on consumer
protection and financial stability. So long as hedge fund clients are either
wealthy investors or regulated institutions, the tangible benefits from di-
rectly regulating hedge funds for consumer protection reasons appear limited.
Wealthy investors neither need nor want specific micro–prudential protection,
and investments by regulated institutions, such as pension funds, banks, and
insurance companies, are best regulated by their own supervisors (regulating
the demand side rather than the supply side of hedge fund products). Finan-
cial stability reasons for regulating hedge funds, which are the main focus of
1Reaching $1.160 bn, in May 2004, and representing more than 8000 hedge funds and
10% of all assets managed by the US mutual funds industry. Data from Alternative Fund
Services Review, an industry publication, and Correctnet, a data management company
(FT May 15, 2004).
2Whilst regulators had followed the growth of hedge funds in previous decades with
interest, for example, as far back as a 1969 SEC investigative study, the crises of the 1990s
led to major investigations by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (1999),
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) and the Financial Stability Forum
(2000). These reports examined the LTCM failure in great detail, producing a raft of
recommendations. More recently the SEC (2003b) has concluded a major review of hedge
funds activity.
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this paper, are more convincing, particularly since a single hedge fund col-
lapse has the potential to trigger a systemic crisis, as nearly happened with
LTCM. However, the case for not regulating hedge funds is also compelling,
since hedge funds bring clear benefits to the financial system by improving
efficiency, price discovery, and consumer choice.
To date this debate has not led to any substantive changes in the regulation
of hedge funds themselves.3 Nevertheless, if another hedge fund crisis were to
occur this clearly could provide the impetus for major reform. There is a real
concern that the political pressure in such a situation would be so strong that
regulators will be forced to implement overbearing and suboptimal solutions,
as happened following the 1929 crash. Prior analysis of the costs and benefits
of different forms of regulation can play a role in helping to guard against
such an outcome.
Traditional regulatory techniques, such as activity restrictions and disclosure
are likely to be ineffective for the macro–prudential regulation of hedge funds,
partly because since hedge funds are nimble enough to move their operations
elsewhere, and not least since hedge funds specialize in the most advanced
uses of proprietary financial technology. It is hard to see how even the most
sophisticated regulator can comprehend all the models in active use, draw
firm conclusions from those models, and issue effective guidelines based on
those conclusions. Instead, they are more likely to resort to blunt regulatory
instruments, which may unduly hinder the regular operation of hedge funds
without much benefit.
In fact, in contrast to other financial firms whose actions lead to calls for
regulation, hedge funds are quite unique. Regulation is typically called for
when the decisions of firms cause significant net costs to third parties. An
example is misselling of pensions which has some private benefits to the
vendors, at the expense not only of their clients, but also undermining public
faith in private pensions provisions. Hedge funds, however, do not fit into this
mold. Whilst their activities can impose negative costs on the economy in a
default, they also provide positive benefits, such as more efficient and liquid
markets.This simultaneous provision of negative and positive externalities
from hedge fund activities means that using traditional regulatory techniques
to eliminate the former may destroy the latter — Killing the geese, including
the geese that lay the golden eggs.
3Although, based upon the SEC (2003b) report and the formal proposal (SEC, 2004),
at an open meeting on Oct. 26, 2004 the SEC voted to adopt Rule 203(b)(3)-2 that requires
hedge fund advisors to register with the Commission under the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 by Feb. 1, 2006.
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Addressing financial stability concerns whilst at the same time preserving the
benefits of hedge funds therefore requires a new regulatory approach. The
extremely large potential downside from a systemic crisis, however remote
the possibility, strongly suggests that a central feature of any such approach
should be its ability to deal with the potential fallout from the failure of
a major hedge fund (there were about eight hundred hedge fund failures
in 2003, up from seven hundred in 2002, but none of them significantly af-
fected the market). The resolution process instigated by the New York Fed
following the collapse of LTCM in 1998 provides one example of such a mech-
anism. When the New York Fed learned of the pending collapse of LTCM
and the potential systemic implications, they brought together all the key
client banks, including prime brokers, and encouraged them to implement
an orderly winding down process for LTCM’s positions with the aim of pro-
viding the least amount of disruption to markets. An important part of this
process was that no public funds were used, with the Fed’s role limited to
managing the process. While in this case Fed was able to use persuasion to
resolve the crisis, what if the client banks had resisted more strongly, the
Fed had been less determined or less persuasive, or the whole process had
become politicized and bogged down?
It is crucial to ensure that any future failure of a systemically important
hedge fund be accompanied by a successful resolution process. One option
is for a formal resolution mechanism to be adopted for such cases. While
the procedural issues are complex, they do not appear insurmountable. For
example, it could be that the relevant supervisors should have the duty and
power to start and carry through the resolution process, with a hedge fund
in difficulty, its prime broker(s), and other client banks obliged to alert the
supervisor if they suspect problems. Furthermore, as a guiding principle it
is is important that client banks and the prime broker bear the whole cost of
this process, and under no circumstances should public funds be contributed
given the moral hazard they could induce. The details of such a mechanism
and its incentive effects clearly require further analysis but hopefully this
proposal serves to focus the debate on what appears to be a prime motivation
for any reform.
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2 The Regulatory Debate
2.1 The Legal Environment
The special status of hedge funds is rooted in particular exemptions from
the securities laws of the US, and some other countries, provided the only
investors in a fund are few in number (less than 100) and accredited, i.e. suf-
ficiently sophisticated and wealthy, and for investments only to be offered in
private placements excluding public advertisement and marketing. Meeting
these criteria frees up hedge funds from constraints on investment activities,
governance and transparency.4 These laws were originally designed with con-
sumer protection in mind, and it was felt that accredited investors should
not be legally forced to be protected from fraud and abuse by the securities
industry.5 Other countries, like the UK, have similar laws, but not all juris-
dictions provide the necessary exemptions to allow for the operation of hedge
funds.
If investors find the domestic legal requirements too restrictive they may opt
for hedge funds domiciled offshore, for example in Luxembourg and Ireland
for European investors or in the Caribbean for US investors. These juris-
dictions have advantages in terms of disclosure, and allowable activities, but
the main benefit in offshore investing relates to taxation. However, since
most clients are onshore, the management companies, or advisors, of those
offshore investment vehicles are mostly onshore in the major financial centers
and possess the delegated powers to trade on the fund’s behalf. In the US,
they can choose to be registered with the SEC, and there are calls for regis-
tration to be mandated, as proposed by the SEC in July 2004.6 Currently
around 50% of hedge fund managers are not registered under the ‘Invest-
ment Advisers Act’ of 1940. In much of Europe (including the UK as a
major center) registration is compulsory.
Even if the fund itself or its advisors are unregulated they do not operate
in a regulatory vacuum – they trade on regulated exchanges and deal and
interact with other regulated institutions. Hedge funds outsource most activ-
4For example, regulated funds which do not fall under these exemptions face restric-
tions on leverage, diversification, choice of securities, activities between affiliates, disclo-
sure, governance, redemption, transparency, and registration.For country details see, for
example, SEC (2003b) for the US, Financial Services Authority (2002) for the UK and
Lhabitant (2002) for various other jurisdictions. For further background see Connor and
Woo (2004).
5Furthermore, legal exemptions allow for funds of funds, i.e., funds that do not trade
on their own account, but instead invest in other hedge funds.
6See SEC (2004).
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ities except trading decisions (for example, execution, settlements, clearing,
leverage, risk management, etc.) to prime brokers which generally are major
investment banks.7 Because the prime brokers are regulated, their hedge fund
business indirectly falls under supervisory oversight. For example, in the UK,
the FSA8 is holding meetings with prime brokers over their links with hedge
funds in order to assess the extent of due diligence and risk management,
presumably partly with a view of using prime brokers as early warning signs
of any risk to the financial stability posed or believed to be posed by hedge
funds.
2.2 Approaches to Regulation
The involvement of hedge funds in major financial crises of the 1990s on the
one hand and the substantial benefits that have accrued to their owners and
investors on the other, have resulted in a very polarized debate about the
regulatory status of hedge funds. Inevitably, a wide range of proposals has
been made, spanning the spectrum from banning hedge funds altogether to
preserving the status quo. The large number of distinct proposals regarding
hedge fund regulation can be distilled into four main viewpoints.
Regulate everything At one extreme is the view that hedge funds should
be regulated in the same manner as other financial institutions. This
sometimes reflects a desire for a fair and equal treatment of all finan-
cial institutions, or perhaps a generic public distrust of markets. How-
ever, for supervisors a desire to fully regulate hedge funds may be due
to political risk aversion manifesting as a ‘fear of the unknown’, since
they generally are exposed to considerable political downside risk when
something adverse happens, with little political upside when markets
are functioning smoothly. The relative importance of these character-
istics varies by country and is likely to depend on the maturity of the
country’s financial markets. For example, the political downside may
be greater in countries with a traditional culture of heavily regulated
markets as opposed to countries such as the UK and US which have
long enjoyed considerable benefits of their extensive and lightly regu-
lated financial markets.
7Most hedge funds only deal with one prime broker, while some might use more.
Tremont estimates that through November 2003, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and
Bear Stearns had a 79% of the prime broker market.
8As reported in the Financial Times (2004a)
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Laissez–faire At the other extreme is the view that hedge funds should not
be regulated at all because of the efficiency they provide to the financial
system. This view is perhaps most notably associated with US Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan.9 This has also become the
default option in the Basel–II negotiations but for a different reason
as the various members of the Basel Committee have not been able to
come to an agreement on how hedge funds could be incorporated in the
Basel–II process.
Micro–prudential The opaque nature of most hedge funds makes it harder
for investors to verify hedge fund valuations, giving rise to the potential
for fraudulent behavior. Recent mispricing scandals have led to calls
for increased quality, and auditing of, hedge funds disclosures. For
example, the absence of an independent check on hedge fund advisors’
asset valuations was one of the most serious concerns of the recent SEC
report (p.79 SEC, 2003b), whilst popular media, such as Business
Week (2004), have also called for mandated third party auditing of
valuations. Most recent calls for hedge fund regulation have been for
such micro-prudential reasons.
Macro–prudential The strongest and most convincing calls for hedge fund
regulation relate to financial stability. Hedge fund activities in the
ERM crisis, the Asian crisis, the Yen crisis of 1998, and most signifi-
cantly the LTCM liquidity crisis, are the focal point of the discussion.
The primary concern is the potential for hedge funds to trigger or ex-
acerbate liquidity crises, increasing counterparty risk and ultimately
leading to domino style defaults in the financial system.
3 Perceived Costs and Benefits of Hedge Funds
Behind the different viewpoints on hedge fund regulation, lie differing as-
sessments of the possible costs of their activities and the benefits they can
provide. As often is the case with regulation, the externalities justifying
hedge fund regulation are superficially more visible than the benefits from
9See, for example, Testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve, Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services
(Oct. 1, 1998) (Greenspan (1998)): “If, somehow, hedge funds were barred worldwide,
the American financial system would lose the benefits conveyed by their efforts, including
arbitraging price differentials away. The resulting loss in efficiency and contribution to
financial value added and the nation’s standard of living would be a high price to pay–to
my mind, too high a price.”
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not regulating. It is easy to point to well–publicized cases where hedge funds
may have been destabilizing, while the efficiency they bring to the financial
markets is less visible, since smoothly functioning markets are often taken
for granted.
3.1 Costs Attributed to Hedge Funds
3.1.1 “Hedge Funds are Destabilizing”
Hedge funds are frequently accused of destabilizing the international financial
system. This is especially true for macro funds, which take large positions
on the long–term direction of macroeconomic developments. While a hedge
fund’s interest in a country may not be to the governments liking, this does
not mean that the hedge fund is necessarily predatory or destabilizing. It
may simply be exploiting the difference between the real state of the economy
and market prices. In this case, the hedge fund would be beneficial to the
economy by eliminating the mispricing.
The available empirical evidence on whether hedge funds are destabilizing
is mixed. Hedge funds are considered to have exerted a significant market
impact during the ERM crisis (see e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2000), but not dur-
ing the Asian crisis (see e.g. Choe et al., 1998; Fung and Hsieh, 2000; Fung
et al., 2000; Goetzmann et al., 2000). Indeed, during the Asian crisis, foreign
hedge funds seem to have had a stronger belief in the economy of the crisis
countries than domestic investors. They supported the domestic currencies
of those countries, while the rapid currency depreciations were caused by bet-
ter informed domestic corporations, contradicting the convenient “Mahatir
Conjecture.”
Nevertheless, the evidence, hampered by data and methodological limita-
tions, remains inconclusive. For example, in their comments on Fung et al.
(2000), Edwards and Caglayan (2001) note the data problems relating to the
need to consider factors other than changes in Asian currency values which
can affect the returns of the hedge funds considered, as well as to the limited
number of hedge funds considered. Similarly, the Reserve Bank of Australia
(1999) criticizes the methodology of Goetzmann et al. (2000) for assuming
that movements in specific currencies over fixed time intervals were the sole
source of returns for the hedge funds.
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3.1.2 “Hedge Funds are Overly Levered”
Leverage (or gearing) refers to the extent to which a financial institution is
indebted, usually relative to its capital base. This leverage may be direct
through formal debt such as bonds, IOU’s, credit lines and so forth, or indi-
rect through implicit borrowing due to certain derivative operations.10 This
indirect leverage is particularly important for hedge funds given their often
significant derivatives positions.
Hedge funds, unlike regulated financial institutions do not have an upper
limit on allowable leverage. This leverage is argued to increase both the
likelihood and severity of hedge fund defaults, potentially leading to financial
crises. Whilst such concerns have long been expressed,11 they were amplified
following the LTCM collapse. At present, hedge funds do not appear to
employ very high levels of leverage. In 2003 84% of hedge funds had leverage
less than 200% of capital and only 2% used leverage over 500%,12 Gupta and
Liang (2004) find that less than 4% of live and 11% of dead hedge funds in
their sample would have violated the Basel-II capital adequacy requirements
as of March 2003, with the under–capitalized funds relatively small. Market
reports also suggest that leverage has not increased markedly recently and
that it remains moderate compared to levels reached in 1997/1998.13 In
addition, the view of excessively levered hedge funds must be contrasted
with the leverage of other regulated financial institutions, particularly the
banks. Since banks have an 8% capital adequacy ratio, they can in principle
be levered more than 12 times. As a consequence, worries about systemic
stability due to the potential unlimited hedge fund leverage do not seem to
be supported by the available facts.14 Extreme hedge fund leverage in crises
is a symptom, not the cause of the crisis event.
10For instance, being long a call option is effectively equivalent to being long a certain
number of stocks (the “delta”), financed in part by borrowing cash.
11For example, in the 1992 Joint Report on the (US) Government Securities Market.
12Hennessee Group (2003).
13See Bank of England (2004), p.53, who also note that 1997/98 may not be an appro-
priate benchmark.
14This viewpoint is made strongly by the Financial Economists Roundtable (1999) re-
sponse to the President’s working group report on LTCM: the “emphasis on excessive
leverage as a systemic concern is unsupported. It fails to make a case that excessive
leverage is a systemic concern, that private markets fail to constrain hedge fund leverage
adequately, and that additional regulatory steps are needed to assure that in the future
hedge fund leverage will not be excessive. Even assuming that a case can be made (which
the Report does not make) that excessive leverage was the primary culprit in the LTCM
collapse, this single event cannot by itself be the basis for the claim that leverage is in
general excessive in either the hedge fund industry or the financial system as a whole”.
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In addition, by its very nature, leverage is difficult to measure. It clearly
cannot be easily captured by enforced disclosure of direct exposures, since
issues such as pricing and aggregation of exposures are very complex. It is
also not obvious how such information could be communicated in an informa-
tive manner to the supervisors who would have to retain sufficient expertise
to analyze the disclosure of every hedge fund. Furthermore, such informa-
tion would likely be of limited value, even if it allowed supervisors to draw
the right conclusions, as it would be extremely sensitive to the potentially
rapid changes in the value of derivatives positions and capital values, partic-
ularly in times of crises. As a consequence it seems impossible to measure
the contribution of leverage to systemic risk with any degree of accuracy.
In addition, while a hedge fund crisis might be coupled with extreme levels
of leverage, as in the case of LTCM, is it important to note that extreme
leverage is primarily due to an erosion of a hedge fund capital base, not an
increase in overall speculative positions. Therefore, even if we could measure
leverage, it might not be a very useful early warning signal, as extremely
high leverage is likely to be correlated with crises, rather than predictive of
crises.
3.1.3 “Hedge Funds Constitute Counterparty Risk”
Since hedge funds are unencumbered by mandated leverage restrictions, with
primary activities focussed on relatively high risk trading, hedge fund defaults
may be more likely and more damaging than in the case of regulated financial
institutions. Essentially, hedge funds cause counterparty risk for regulated
trading partners (such as prime brokers) and investors, thus increasing credit
risk in the regulated part of the financial system.
Counterparty risk was an important issue in the LTCM crisis, where a key
concern was the high exposure of major investment banks to LTCM settle-
ment risk, and a lack of information about overall exposures. Because of
network linkages of their inter–bank exposures, both LTCM creditor banks,
and financial institutions with no direct connection to LTCM were exposed to
indirect counterparty risk. The main worry in such networks is the triggering
of domino style defaults throughout the banking system.15 The importance
for financial stability is hard to ascertain, however, as little empirical evidence
has been provided to address this point.
15These issues are discussed on a theoretical level by Allen and Gale (2000) and Ci-
fuentes et al. (2003) who study the network structure put in place by the balance sheet
counterparty relationships among financial market participants that can contribute to and
amplify the risk of financial instability.
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As a result of the LTCM crisis, the improvement of counterparty risk man-
agement became a key focus of the Financial Stability Forum (2000) and the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) reports, with prime bro-
kers keeping much closer eyes on client hedge fund positions and liquidity.
One approach suggested to minimize counterparty risk is to adopt continu-
ous settlement, mark–to-market, and margins, which certainly can help in
containing counterparty risk. Unfortunately, continuous settlement can also
contribute to market instability.16 Consider a hedge fund which has a supe-
rior pricing model used to implement an arbitrage strategy. The favorable
outcome of this strategy relies on both the long position in the cheap asset
and the short position in the expensive asset being held to maturity where
they offset each other, giving the fund immediate arbitrage profits. How-
ever, if the shorted asset appreciates sharply and is marked–to–market then
this may trigger margin calls and a potential liquidity problem for the fund.
A fire–sale of the arbitrage portfolio may be necessary, leading to potential
losses, and even default of the entire fund, despite the initial absence of de-
fault risk at maturity.17 In this case marking–to–market causes the default
rather than preventing the default. Since traders know this risk ex-ante,
they will not attempt to fully correct the mispricings, leading to market
inefficiencies.
3.1.4 “Hedge Funds Herd”
Hedge funds are often accused of herding, with the ERM and Asian currency
crises cited as prime examples. The academic notion of herding (see e.g.
Avery and Zemski, 1998) refers to the phenomenon by which funds mimic
other funds, despite the fact that their private information or proprietary
model suggests other strategies. In common parlance, herding is more gen-
eral, involving hedge funds mimicking other funds in implementing trading
strategies, for example attacking specific currencies.
Is herding by hedge funds likely? Their strategies are unencumbered by man-
dates, and hence they are much more flexible in implementing new trading
strategies or investing in new assets or markets, as well as putting on shorts.
If flexibility and innovation are the raisons d’eˆtre for hedge funds, one might
expect hedge funds to be less likely to herd than other institutions. This
does not prevent them from putting on the same trades roughly at the same
time. In addition, for a hedge fund to develop costly proprietary trading
16This point has for instance been made in various guises by De Long et al. (1990) or
Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
17This is similar to what happened with Metallgesellschaft in 1993.
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models and then ignore the model in favor of herding puts it at a distinct
disadvantage to a lower cost copycat fund.18
For some hedge fund types, it is natural to have similar positions. For in-
stance, convertible or merger arbitrage hedge funds tend to put on similar
trades by the very nature of their strategies – this does not constitute herding
any more than holding the market portfolio can be called herding. It is also
possible that the remuneration schemes for hedge fund managers encourages
less herding compared to their mutual fund counterparts if it is the case that
the mutual fund managers’ pay is more explicitly linked to the benchmark-
ing of fund performance. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show empirically that
career concerns imply that mutual fund managers tend to herd and to not
take on much nonsystematic risk.
The empirical evidence on herding by hedge funds is mixed. In some cases
the evidence is relatively clear, for example as in the ERM crisis (Fung and
Hsieh, 2000), whilst in other episodes there is less evidence. Liang (2004)
argues that there may be some evidence of herding in down markets. In such
markets, hedge funds are compelled to put on more similar trades, which in
turn affects liquidity negatively and feeds back into the correlation structure.
Whilst most mispricings exploited by hedge funds have a more or less known
reversion or resolution time, bubbles are open ended by definition. This
open–endedness and lack of common knowledge implies that it may be worth-
while to ride the bubble for some time before getting out, and even shorting
the bubble. This exposure to bubbles might be most pronounced in macro
hedge funds.19
Hedge funds of course may act as a catalyst, by triggering herding by other
investors, but available evidence suggests that this has not been the case.
Fung and Hsieh (2000) find indirect evidence that hedge funds were late
comers to the trade during the Asian crisis, while Eichengreen and Mathieson
(1999) find no evidence that other traders were guided by the positions taken
by hedge funds in prior periods. Indeed they argue that the data suggests
that hedge funds often act as ‘contrarians’.
18Interestingly the Financial Times (2004b) notes that the movement of individuals from
investment banks into positions as hedge fund managers could create a potential similarity
in trading strategies between former colleagues and also their employers.
19See e.g. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) or Zigrand (2001b) for more on this issue,
especially in relation to information on arbitrage and common knowledge.
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3.1.5 “Hedge Funds use up Market Liquidity”
Hedge funds are sometimes accused of ‘using up’ valuable liquidity, hence
impeding other investors. By liquidity in this context we mean ease of trade
(often viewed in terms of the price impact of trades) rather than access to
funds. If hedge funds in aggregate are large sellers of an asset or currency this
may have a significant price impact and impose a cost so that other investors
cannot find a buyer to close their trades at ‘reasonable’ prices. However,
it is also likely that hedge funds do exactly the opposite. While the rest
of the financial industry, perhaps due to Basel–II risk constraints, are all
selling, hedge funds see opportunities and buy, hence providing liquidity and
stability, as discussed by Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2003). Again, the case is
inconclusive.
3.1.6 “Hedge Funds are Prone to Commit Fraud”
Since hedge funds are not subject to the same disclosure requirements as
mutual funds or other financial institutions, the potential for hedge funds
to commit fraud is higher. Fraudulent activities include the misappropria-
tion of assets, mispricing, insider trading, the misrepresentation of portfolio
performance, inappropriate marketing, the falsification of experience, creden-
tials and past returns and misleading disclosure. Indeed, with the increased
retailization of hedge funds, supervisors have expressed growing concerns
about consumer protection for hedge fund investors (see e.g. Financial Ser-
vices Authority, 2002; SEC, 2003b). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that investors in hedge funds are very much concerned with the same
issues. However, there appears to be little evidence indicating that hedge
funds or their advisors engage disproportionately in fraudulent activity,20 re-
gardless of whether they are registered or not. However, the expansion in
the client base of hedge funds, e.g. by relaxation of the accreditation criteria
(retailization)21 or allowing regulated institutions, such as pension funds to
invest in hedge funds, has led to calls for changes in the regulatory structure
of hedge funds.
20Recent CFTC estimates suggest in the last five years hedge funds have accounted for
around 2% of SEC and CFTC enforcement actions (SEC, 2003a).
21This is happening in a number of jurisdictions, for example in relation to smaller in-
vestors in Hong Kong and Germany in particular. For instance, a new law in Germany, Law
dated 15.12.03 (the so-called “Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz”) allows retail investors
to invest in single hedge–funds as well as in funds-of-funds. The law provides that single
hedge funds can only be sold by registered financial advisors, while hedge funds-of-funds
can be sold also by non-registered financial advisors.
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These views appear misguided. Accredited investors willingly place their
money with unregistered hedge funds, fully cognizant of the potential for
abuse. If there is any desire by those investors for better auditing, the in-
tensely competitive hedge fund industry will likely provide such services,
without any regulatory prompting. The question of regulated institutions,
such as pension funds, investing in hedge funds is similarly clear. Ultimately,
it is the responsibility of the investing institution’s regulator, i.e. such invest-
ments should be regulated on the demand side for hedge fund investments
(e.g. by pension fund regulators) and not on the supply side (ie by hedge fund
regulators). For example, those regulating pension funds have a much better
view of how much risk pension funds can assume, and it would be prudent
of them only to allow investments into hedge funds who provide audited per-
formance results. No additional hedge fund regulation to address concerns
over fraud is needed. Similarly, a relaxation of the criteria for accredited in-
vestors (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore in Asia and Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg and Switzerland in Europe) could be accompanied by similar
micro–prudential restrictions that only apply to those retail investors.
3.2 The Benefits Attributed to Hedge Funds
3.2.1 “Hedge Funds Aid Price Discovery”
In an age where much of the mutual funds industry is either index tracking,
passively managed, or following narrow mandates, the comparative advan-
tage of hedge funds is not to track but to be flexible. As a consequence hedge
fund trading contributes to price discovery. By acting upon their research,
hedge funds affect prices and volumes and reveal some of their private in-
formation to the market at large, helping assets move back to fundamental
values more quickly. By–and–large, fundamental prices allow market partic-
ipants to engage in better and more efficient resource allocation.
3.2.2 “Hedge Funds Aid Competition and the Invisible Hand”
The research and trading strategies of a large number of hedge funds are
aimed at deriving profits from the perceived mispricing of securities. Mis-
pricing between assets arises because market traders do not have costless and
immediate access to all publicly available markets, exchanges and informa-
tion while trading. For example, an option on the S&P–500 index trades in
Chicago, while the underlying stocks trade on various exchanges, like NAS-
DAQ and NYSE. If the derivatives price and the underlying stock prices do
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not properly reflect each other (e.g. do not satisfy the relevant no–arbitrage
relationships), mispricing occurs.
Traders profiting from the resulting arbitrage opportunities induce prices to
move towards the true price, and hence allow trades to happen that other-
wise would not have taken place.22 Such activities can further aid efficiency
by increasing the competitive pressures on market makers or intermediaries,
whose bread and butter are the various spreads. To cite the regulator (SEC,
2003b), “The absence of hedge funds from these markets [of innovative finan-
cial instruments] could lead to fewer risk management choices and a higher
cost of capital.”
These benefits might well be considerable, but due to lack of data we are not
aware of any research that has tried to quantify these benefits. Some parallels
can be drawn from the academic literature on international economics, see
for instance Van Wincoop (1999) or Davis et al. (2001) who quantify the
portion of gains from trade that arises from cross-border trade in financial
assets. Their estimates vary from 1 and 5% of GDP for developed and
developing countries respectively, to a multiple of those fractions. In the
case of domestic markets, we suspect the gains from eliminating mispricing
could be even larger. Whilst hedge funds do not eliminate all mispricings,
they can play an important role, particularly in the markets in which they
are most active.
3.2.3 “Hedge Funds Provide Diversification”
Traditional fund managers are usually constrained by their mandates in
choosing trading strategies, while individual investors are usually constrained
both by transaction costs and technological knowhow. Hedge funds are not
subject to such constraints and so may provide investment strategies pre-
ferred by investors, but otherwise unobtainable.
Considerable empirical and theoretical evidence demonstrates that hedge
funds provide investors with risk–return tradeoffs not available from tradi-
tional funds (see e.g. Lhabitant, 2002). Kosowski (2002) in an empirical study
of mutual fund managers demonstrates that even if active fund managers did
not on average outperform an index in a bull market, they suffer less in bear
markets, effectively providing lower risk for an equivalent or higher return
22In other words, hedge funds help reduce pricing inefficiencies and allow marginal rates
of substitution across the global economy to converge. In classical economic terms, we say
that the arbitrageurs provide some of the benefits of the elusive Walrasian auctioneer. For
the technical details see Zigrand (1997) or Zigrand (2001a).
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than an index. A key reason for this is the flexibility of active managers
(which is even greater for hedge fund managers) to alter styles depending
on market conditions. This enables them to pick an asset mix whose perfor-
mance tends to be less sensitive to bear markets. This outperformance is the
result of market timing rather than of following a more conservative strategy
by which a larger proportion of wealth is invested in less risky securities from
the outset.
In addition to providing diversification benefits for their own investors, hedge
funds indirectly benefit other investors. Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2003) argue
that the presence of hedge funds in the market reduces correlation between
assets, especially in bear markets, thus benefiting all investors, not only the
direct hedge fund investors. This particular benefit of hedge funds has not
yet found widespread recognition, and we are not aware of any empirical
evaluations.
3.2.4 “Hedge Funds Aid Market Clearing and Provide Liquidity”
Rapid advances in financial technology and data availability, encouraged by
Basel–II, have brought advanced trading and risk management techniques
within the reach of just about any financial institution and investor. This
has resulted in the information available to market participants and their
resulting behavior more uniform than at any other time in history. As a con-
sequence endogenous risk, as discussed in Dan´ıelsson and Shin (2003) and
Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2003), is greatly amplified. This phenomenon is es-
pecially damaging during financial crises, where highly correlated information
and behavior conspire to amplify the severity of financial crises, by leading
to a reduction of liquidity at a time when it is needed most. Furthermore,
since hedge funds are unencumbered by mandated risk limits and generally
operate at the top end of the technological chain, they have the possibility to
act countercyclically during a crisis, providing liquidity and reducing volatil-
ity. While regulated investors may need to liquidate risky positions for no
reason other than regulatory compliance, hedge funds may find it profitable
to take the other side of these fire sales, thus providing liquidity. This implies
that the presence of unregulated technologically advanced institutions plays
a key role in ensuring financial stability, and that regulating hedge funds
would actually increase market volatility and decrease liquidity and stability
of financial markets. The issue is certainly not settled, neither in theory nor
in the data.
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4 Application of Existing Regulatory Method-
ology to Hedge Funds – Appropriate, Suf-
ficient or Desirable?
The main challenge in designing a regulatory structure for hedge funds is
striking a balance between leaving hedge funds as unencumbered as possible
so as to deliver the benefits they offer, while at the same time containing
any possible systemic events resulting from a hedge fund induced crash.23
Supervisors could apply the most important tools in their armory for this
purpose: disclosure and activity restrictions. Both of these have been proven
successful in day-to-day regulation of the financial system, and it is frequently
suggested that they be applied to the regulation of hedge funds. While that
might be a sensible proposition if we think of hedge funds as any other fi-
nancial institution, we have considerable doubts that these tools would be
effective in simultaneously preserving the benefits of hedge funds and con-
taining systemic risk. The supervisors instead are more likely to resort to
blunt regulatory instruments, which may unduly hinder the regular opera-
tion of hedge funds without much benefit. A key worry is that if a major
hedge fund crisis occurs, stringent sub-optimal regulations are adopted, as
have happened following the 1929 crash. It is important following any crisis
episode that the markets recover as quickly as possible, and that hasty or
populist laws are not implemented.
4.1 Disclosure
Public and private disclosure is integral to current regulatory regimes. Public
disclosure provides information to consumers and provides market discipline
while private disclosure provides supervisors with a measure of the stability
of the institution in question. Disclosure of market risk can be based on
summary statistics (e.g. value–at–risk) or position level information. It has
been argued that enforced disclosure by larger hedge funds could play a key
part in the macro–prudential regulatory mechanism by helping to forewarn
and reduce the likelihood of crises should a hedge fund encounter difficulties.
For example, such views motivated the so-called Baker Bill reform proposed
23As highlighted previously, the costs of such events appear of an order of magnitude
larger than any other costs of hedge fund activities and are thus the focus of discussion in
this paper.
19
in the US in 1999.24 The key issues on greater disclosures concern its nature,
its effectiveness in achieving the macro–prudential objectives and whether
such disclosure could rather be achieved through market discipline alone.
Here we are not concerned with the micro–prudential rationale for disclosure,
which has been discussed above.25
4.1.1 Disclosure of Summary Statistics of Aggregate Exposures
Value-at-risk (VaR) has emerged as the key component of financial regulation
pertaining to market (trading) risk. It captures potential losses on a trading
portfolio, typically the so–called 99% loss, i.e. losses that happen one out
of every 100 days, or 2.5 times per year on average. The Basel-I agreement
and Basel-II proposals focus on this risk level. VaR does a reasonable job
in capturing risk for small homogenous portfolios without derivative or fixed
income assets. However, as a portfolio gets larger and more complicated,
and especially when risk across asset classes and trading desks is considered
or derivative or fixed income assets are introduced, VaR as a risk measure
becomes increasingly irrelevant (see e.g. Dan´ıelsson, 2002, for more details on
this issue). For hedge funds, who usually employ very complicated trading
strategies focused on derivatives, while rapidly changing positions and even
styles, VaR is of little use. In addition, since the VaR measure is only a
quantile of the distribution of profit and loss, it says nothing about the
losses that can happen in exceptional circumstances — all it tells us is the
losses that can happen in normal circumstances. Thus, since systemic risk is
only about exceptional tail events, VaR is not meaningful for systemic risk
measurement.
This problem is compounded by the serious flaw inherent in the VaR measure
which is that it can easily and legitimately be manipulated by lowering VaR
while increasing potential losses.26 While considerable literature on alterna-
24The Bill, H.R. 2924, ”The Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” did not get past the Com-
mittee stage in Congress. It’s main features were the enforced disclosure of balance sheet
information and measures of market risk of the largest 25 hedge funds to the Federal
Reserve Board and other regulators.
25These would seem to be behind the SEC (2004) recommendation for the registration
of most hedge fund managers as Investment Advisors (as recommended by, or as already
required in much of Europe) which would imply disclosure on issues such as conflicts
arising from side-by-side management of hedge funds and other client accounts and hedge
fund advisors’ relationships with prime brokers.
26See e.g. Ahn et al. (1999) who demonstrate that simple and easily implemented option
strategies allow a hedge fund to lower its VaR significantly by taking mass out of the left
tail, while at the same time raising losses in the tail by pushing the remaining mass further
out. In that sense, riskier outcomes from a systemic point of view do not only fail to be
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tive risk measures and better risk measurement techniques has emerged in
recent years, we nevertheless believe that current state–of–the–art methods
do not allow us to capture the systemic risk component of a hedge fund’s
position.
4.1.2 Detailed disclosures
If it is not possible to capture the contribution of a hedge fund trading
strategy to systemic risk with a simple summary statistic, like VaR, the only
avenue open to supervisors is to require detailed position level disclosure,
either publicly or privately to supervisors. It is likely that the former would
be strenuously resisted by hedge funds while the latter would be resisted by
the supervisors. In addition, it is doubtful that such disclosure would be
effective.
The flexibility of hedge fund investment strategies, which is their great advan-
tage over other investment classes, fundamentally depends on confidentiality
of trading positions. Furthermore, publicly disclosing trade level information
is likely to cause front running and to erode private benefits from research.
Such disclosure would undermine the ability, and hence incentives, of hedge
funds to provide the market efficiency benefits. Public disclosure would most
likely be of little benefit since it would have to be assessable by its intended
audience. As a practical matter, this means that much of the technical de-
tails would have to be left out, effectively implying that the public disclosure
would have to take the form of summary statistics, which as discussed above
are of limited use.
The alternative is a private disclosure of position level information to the
supervisor. Most large and successful hedge funds employ rather compli-
cated pricing models and trading strategies involving complex derivatives.
Calculating the risk of one such instrument is usually quite challenging, and
calculating the risk of a portfolio of derivative instruments requires techni-
cal expertise at the highest (and most expensive) level. This involves an
intimate knowledge of the underlying pricing model and positions. For the
supervisor this task is compounded by having to aggregate the risk across
hedge funds. Effectively, the supervisor would have to run a risk engine that
simultaneously encompasses the positions of all hedge funds. Such a task is
beyond the limits of existing technology.
If mandatory disclosure to a regulator is the way ahead, the question remains
regarding what use information from mandatory disclosure would be put to
flagged by the VaR number, they go hand-in-hand with a lower VaR!
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by the regulator. For example, in the special case of LTCM, it could be
argued on one hand that knowledge of the positions could have enabled the
regulator to inform its counterparties and thus prevented the build up of such
large leverage. On the other hand there was a rapid build up in leverage which
may not have been captured by regulatory disclosure given time lags since the
extreme leverage only occurred after the crisis was underway. Ultimately, the
manner of its intervention is of crucial importance, rather than the disclosure
mechanism.
The regulators themselves are likely to be reluctant to require detailed private
disclosure, because of future political implications of its interventions or lack
of interventions. In the event of future problems relating to hedge fund
activity, regulators are exposed to an ex–post criticism that they had the
information and should have prevented the problem. And alternatively, for
supervisors to take action erroneously is also problematic. Essentially, the
fear of type I error which occurs when a regulator acts but shouldn’t have,
and type II error which occurs when a regulator fails to take action, but
should have, is of considerable importance to supervisors. The nature of
politics induces the regulator to minimize type II errors at the expense of
type I errors.
There is, however, an alternative mechanism for using private information
about hedge fund positions for the purpose of measuring systemic risk, i.e.
via prime brokers. They observe the whole trading activity of client hedge
funds, and often run its risk engines. Given their involvement in counter-
party risk, they have a strong incentive to monitor fund exposures closely.
Such continuous monitoring can provide early warning signs for systemic risk.
While this is essentially a market solution, supervisors, who already regulate
the prime brokers, could require that prime brokers fulfill such a function.
Following LTCM, prime brokers have become much more concerned about
counterparty risk, and tend to require full position level and loan disclosure
in the case a hedge fund uses more than one prime broker. The reason is
that excessive concentration of positions is, in conjunction with the direc-
tional nature of some bets, as well as illiquidity, the major reason for a hedge
fund demise. Prime brokers thereby play a role as risk managers and can
use their power to recall short–term credit lent to the hedge funds in order
to impose acceptable levels of risk taking. This latter ability can potentially
give prime brokers much more power than banks have over their regular bor-
rowers. However, there are also factors which could weaken the incentive of
prime brokers to play such a disciplining role, for example the competitive
pressures for mandates from hedge funds.
While those regulatory monitoring and disclosure burdens imposed upon
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prime brokers may seem onerous, as we argue below this is not necessarily
the case, and besides market discipline may perhaps be made more incentive
compatible by requiring prime brokers as well as other market participants
to purchase and hold a certain amount of traded subordinated debt in the
hedge funds. Clearly, this is only realistic for hedge funds of a certain size,
which one might call the systemically important hedge funds. The details of
how this might best be achieved mirror the argument in Calomiris (1998).
For instance, the holdings must be spread out so that there is little risk of the
subordinated debt holder being bailed out, which would negate the purpose
of subordinated debt to some extent.
4.2 Prescriptive Activity Restrictions
An important component in the regulation of financial institutions are ac-
tivity restrictions. For example, banks are usually prevented from lending
too much to a single entity in order to ensure the bank’s solvency in case
its largest client defaults.27 However, from a macro–prudential point of view
capital requirements constitute the biggest part of activity restrictions. Reg-
ulated financial institutions are required to hold 8% of their risk weighted
assets as safe or riskless capital, implying an allowable leverage factor of 12.
For the trading book, the bank’s capital is at least three times 99% ten day
VaR. For example, if the trading book holds US$100mn of the S&P index,
the required capital is around US$27mn.
It is conceivable that similar restrictions could be imposed on hedge funds,
perhaps limiting leverage, the type of trading positions or trading strategies.
Unfortunately, this leads to a Catch 22 situation. On the one hand, for the
regulations to be effective, hedge funds will have to lose the flexibility which
defines them. On the other hand, the regulations may not be effective, pos-
sibly due to regulatory arbitrage or feedback effects. Indeed, dangerously
high leverage is probably due to a vanishing capital base in a crisis situa-
tion, rather than a deliberate strategic decision. In that case regulation is
counterproductive, since forcing the hedge fund to lower the leverage ratio
would mean that the hedge fund needs to sell risky assets in a fire sale at the
worst moment. This might not only use up market liquidity, but is likely to
lead to further falls in asset prices, leading to yet more turbulence, which in
turn would require hedge funds to sell even more assets and so forth. This is
27In the Basel Accords, banks are not allowed to have any single large non-bank risk
in excess of 25% of their capital, and the sum of large risks cannot exceed 800% of their
capital. A “large risk” is defined as a loan that exceeds 10% of the capital of the bank
that grants it. See for instance Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1991).
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precisely the scenario analyzed in Dan´ıelsson and Zigrand (2003). In short,
we do not believe that prescriptive risk–sensitive regulation is the panacea as
sometimes claimed. In fact there are good reasons why it may lead to more,
not less, systemic risk.
Indeed, such restrictions may not be necessary from a systemic point of view
in the first place. The work of Gupta and Liang (2004) showed empirically
that the fraction of live hedge funds that would violate the strict Basel-II
capital requirements for banks is negligible. Furthermore, even if large hedge
funds did want to employ extreme levels of leverage, their prime brokers
and their major share holders, including the partners themselves, may not
tolerate such high leverage. For small and medium–sized hedge funds, their
leverage levels are unlikely to be important from a systemic point of view.
5 Proposals: Focusing on Systemic Events
Banking supervisors are faced with a dilemma. Even a remote probability
that a hedge fund collapse would cause a systemic crisis warrants having
some type of regulatory mechanism in place. At the same time, the extant
regulatory tools of greater disclosure and activity restrictions appear too
blunt to be able to provide an effective and efficient regulatory structure for
hedge funds.
In designing prudential regulations, it is important to consider the actual
externality meriting regulation, in particular, the notion of systemic crisis.
Whilst there are various, often vague, interpretations of this concept, it is
essential to define this concretely. Considering the regulatory and academic
literature on the subject, what most people have in mind is a failure of mar-
kets to clear in an orderly manner, bringing with it a collapse of the financial
system due to insolvencies leading to a potential domino effect in defaults.28
The costs of such an event are likely to be enormous. If markets do not oper-
ate properly, the trades that are required to self–finance positions and to keep
firms and financial institutions solvent cannot be executed at a reasonable,
or indeed at any, price. If this situation lasts, the crisis will directly impact
the production and consumption sectors of the economy leading to substan-
28Many transmission mechanisms may lead to economic costs. Among them we can
mention the failure to mark-to-market, the failure to respond to margin calls, the failure
to sell assets held as means of payment against a debt as markets are inoperative (for
instance frozen bank deposits). All these channels lead to defaults and result in further
credit rationing.
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tial real costs.29 Whilst the costs of such an event are hard to quantify, the
output losses during recent banking crises of 5-10% of annual GDP provide
an indication of the potential scale (Hoggarth et al., 2003). Any regulatory
proposals should therefore aim to minimise such costs and ensure an efficient
and timely resolution to any such crisis.
It must however be stressed that a systemic crisis arising from a hedge fund
failure appears to be a low probability, if high impact, event. In actual fact,
almost all hedge fund failures and dissolutions get resolved without affecting
markets significantly (there were about eight hundred hedge fund failures in
2003, up from seven hundred in 2002). This includes some sizeable funds,
such as Robertson’s Tiger Management funds for instance, which liquidated
$6 bn worth of assets in March 2000, having lost about $20 bn prior to
dissolution.
The economically reasonable approach to follow is two-pronged. Akin to
the problem of setting up an efficient global financial system, the regulatory
framework of hedge funds needs to comprise credible and clear ex-ante cost-
sharing mechanisms as well as crisis management procedures.
Could the resolution process instigated by the New York Fed following the
collapse of LTCM in 1998 provide important lessons for how to proceed ex-
post? When the New York Fed learned of the pending collapse of LTCM
and the potential systemic implications, they brought together all the key
client banks and encouraged them to implement an orderly winding down
process for LTCM’s positions with the aim of providing the least amount of
disruption to the economy. An important part of this process was that no
public funds were used, with the Fed’s role limited to managing the process.
While the outcome is controversial, and there is no way to prove that in the
absence of this resolution process there would have been a systemic crisis,
the possibility that this could have happened appears to have justified the
intervention.
While the Fed was able to use moral persuasion to resolve the LTCM cri-
sis, what if the LTCM client banks had resisted more strongly, the Fed had
been less determined or less persuasive, or the whole process had become
politicized and bogged down? Such a possibility highlights the need for a
credible resolution mechanism to deal with the default of systemically im-
portant hedge funds.
Whilst the objective of this proposal is clear – to minimize the potential real
costs of such a failure – the procedural issues and related incentive effects
29Our attempt to a formal modelling of this idea can be found for instance in Dan´ıelsson
and Zigrand (2003).
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are complex.30 For example, if a formal mechanism is adopted, which party
or parties have the ability or duty to trigger the resolution process – the
regulator, the prime brokers (which at present are locally regulated entities
for the most part), the creditor banks (including the subordinated debt hold-
ers) or the hedge fund itself? What are the informational requirements for
this party? Under what jurisdiction does the resolution mechanism proceed?
These are issues which require further consideration in order to provide the
correct incentives for the various parties.
As a first pass, it would seem ideal that the relevant supervisors should have
the duty and power to start and carry through the resolution process. It is
also important that the supervisor starts this process as early as possible,
both because the extent of the problem and the related costs grows signif-
icantly with time and because it does take some time to understand the
exact nature of the hedge funds’ positions. A carefully thought through con-
tingency plan would contribute to minimal disruption. Both a hedge fund
in difficulty and its prime broker(s) should also be obliged to alert the su-
pervisor if they suspect problems, an obligation whose incentive problems
may be alleviated in part by subordinated debt. The other client banks,
to the extent they also have this knowledge, should have the same report-
ing obligation. Such obligations may not be onerous, since they may be to
various degrees incentive compatible. For instance, prime brokers not only
have typically extended some form of credit to the hedge fund which they
may want to recover, they also risk foregoing the present discounted value of
future transaction costs generated by the (live) hedge fund. And if history
is anything to go by, unwinding, reorganizing or refinancing the portfolio of
a hedge fund may in fact be a profitable endeavour, certainly if the trigger
for the resolution mechanism was a temporary lack of liquidity by the hedge
fund rather than a one-way bet gone bad.
In terms of the discussions themselves, both the client banks and the prime
broker, whose role is particularly important, should have obligations to par-
ticipate. Clearly the Chinese wall between the prime broker and the other
divisions of the investment bank must be tight, for otherwise the investment
bank might have an incentive to hasten the demise of a hedge fund. Enforce-
ment of the necessary actions should be a part of the process and may require
a special arbitration body. Additionally, it is important that principals in
the hedge fund bear the majority of the cost of this process, and under no
circumstances should public funds be contributed. Prime brokers may also
need to make funds available during such a resolution procedure (which may
30In another field, this was exemplified most recently by the, now shelved, 2001/2002
IMF proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.
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provide incentives for a closer prudential monitoring), with on the other hand
their upside being the additional future revenues generated from a return to
a well-functioning financial system. The costs to prime brokers must be rea-
sonable and fairly shared in order to prevent prime brokers from moving out
of the regulatory umbrella, by relocating offshore for instance. Obviously, the
use of public funds, or even a bail out, gives rise to a moral hazard problem,
further exasperating the systemic concerns.
Even this simple suggestive framework raises many procedural and incentive
issues which would need to be addressed more formally. For example, might
the exposure of prime brokers to the hedge funds lead them in some circum-
stances to allow the fund to ‘gamble for resurrection’ through taking on even
more risk, and how can those circumstances be mitigated without calling for
overbearing regulation? And even if the prime brokers did hold subordinated
debt, doesn’t the fact that prime brokers are part of a major bank may again
lead to the belief that if worse comes to worst, public funds will bail out the
bank? Are the informational restrictions for investment banks likely to hold
in practice? This preliminary discussion clearly highlights that further anal-
ysis is required. However, hopefully it will also play a broader role – focusing
the regulatory debate towards designing reform proposals which address the
key cost of a systemic hedge fund crisis whilst at the same time preserving
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